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We use an experimental conjoint analysis to investigate the investment criteria of 749 private
equity investors, distinguishing between family offices, business angels, venture capital funds,
growth equity funds, and leveraged buyout funds. Our results indicate that revenue growth is the
most important investment criterion, followed by the value-added of product/service, the
management team's track record, and profitability. Regarding differences across investor types,
we find that family offices, growth equity funds, and leveraged buyout funds place a higher value
on profitability as compared to business angels and venture capital funds. Venture capital funds,
in turn, pay more attention to companies' revenue growth, business models, and current in-
vestors. With these results, our study contributes to the corporate finance literature by deepening
our understanding of how different types of private equity investors make investment decisions.
1. Introduction
Prior research in corporate and entrepreneurial finance has comprehensively investigated the effects of private equity (PE) fi-
nancing. PE investments are associated with improvements in operating performance (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009) and oftentimes
outperform investments in public equity markets (e.g., Ang et al., 2018; Braun et al., 2017; Harris et al., 2014; Kaplan and Schoar,
2005; Kaplan and Sensoy, 2015; Phalippou and Gottschalg, 2009; Robinson and Sensoy, 2013). These findings are consistent across
the different types of PE investments, ranging from leveraged buyout investments (e.g., Kaplan, 1989) to venture capital investments
(e.g., Chemmanur et al., 2011).
The increased performance of PE investments can be ascribed to both selection and treatment effects (Bengtsson and Sensoy,
2011; Bernstein et al., 2016; Chemmanur et al., 2011; Rin et al., 2013; Puri and Zarutskie, 2012). In contrast to stock markets or
debtholders, PE investors are active investors who provide their portfolio companies with bundles of value-added activities. The
benefits can be direct, such as through coaching activities or network access, and indirect through certification effects to third parties
(e.g., customers, skilled workers, alliance partners, and financial intermediaries) (e.g., Bottazzi et al., 2008; Gompers and Lerner,
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2001; Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Korteweg and Sørensen, 2017; Lerner, 1995). The skills of PE investors, however, do not only lie in
nurturing portfolio companies. As recently documented in a survey by Gompers et al. (2016a), PE investors place a heavy emphasis
on both their ability to select promising companies as well as their capacity to add value through financial, governance, and op-
erational engineering.
Despite the importance of the investment selection, however, only a few studies have yet assessed how PE investors actually select
their investments and conduct investment decisions.1 This is lamentable, considering that PE investors devote considerable resources
to evaluating and screening investment opportunities (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2001; Gompers et al., 2016a). Their investment process
starts with screening many businesses, although they ultimately only invest in a few companies. Gompers et al. (2016a), for instance,
report that for every hundred opportunities considered, the average PE investor deeply investigates 15, signs an agreement with
about eight, and closes fewer than four.
Although the decision making of PE investors is often debated (e.g., Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004), this
study is among the first to assess the investment criteria of PE investors. Empirical evidence on their investment criteria is indeed
scarce, arguably due to the empirical challenges of isolating the effects of different company characteristics. This is not possible using
observational data, as it would require assessing investors' preferences between two identical companies that only differ in pre-
determined characteristics. The experiment by Bernstein et al. (2017) uses correspondence testing methodology to randomize in-
vestors' information sets about company characteristics in nearly 17,000 emails. They vary the characteristics revealed in emails and
record when investors click and choose to learn more about the particular company. Similarly, in our study, we randomly vary
investors' information sets in a tightly controlled information environment.
We compare decision-making across different investor types using a large-scale conjoint analysis of 19,474 screening decisions by
749 PE investors, which we obtained by contacting 15,600 investment professionals listed in Pitchbook. Conjoint analysis enables a
more accurate representation of the actual decision behavior and the underlying preference structure of participants, relative to post
hoc approaches such as questionnaires and interviews (e.g., Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1999). Usually, PE investors assess companies
holistically and evaluate multiple criteria simultaneously. In conjoint analysis, decision criteria are measured conjointly. For ex-
ample, investment decisions involve making trade-offs between criteria, which can be captured with conjoint analysis. This ex-
perimental method requires participants to make a series of assessments based on a discrete set of company attributes. Specifically,
the attributes used in our study are (1) profitability, (2) revenue growth, (3) track record of the management team, (4) reputation of
current investors, (5) business model, (6) value-added of product/service, and (7) international scalability. Every participant in the
experiment needed to evaluate multiple companies that differ only in the specifications of the above attributes (e.g., 20% revenue
growth for company 1 versus 50% revenue growth for company 2) and decide in which company they would be more likely to invest.
Then, a multilevel logistic regression model evaluates and compares the importance of the different investment criteria.
The conjoint experiment enables a better understanding of the investment criteria of investors and allows a comparison of these
criteria across investor types. In fact, considerable differences in the decision-making of different investor types likely exist (Lerner
et al., 2007). While there is an established literature on the characteristics and behavior of specific types of investors, a broader
perspective is underdeveloped so far (Hellmann et al., 2017). A more fine-grained analysis is needed, as the supply side of en-
trepreneurial finance ecosystems comprises a very diverse set of investor types. Since we aim to study decision-making across investor
types in an encompassing way, we distinguish the following investor types. (1) Family offices (FOs) are organizations that manage the
wealth of business families by taking actions (i.e., investments) to sustain and grow their wealth (Gilding, 2005; Gray, 2005).
Prominent examples of FOs include Horizons Ventures, the Hong-Kong-based FO of the Kashing family, and Madrone Capital
Partners, the US-based FO of the Walton family (Walmart). Despite their economic relevance and long history, accessing information
about FOs is difficult for both researchers and market participants because FOs are not required to disclose information about their
investments. Quantitative information on FOs is scarce, making them a particularly attractive investor type for our experiment-based
research. (2) Business angels (BAs) are wealthy individuals that invest their own money. As such, they are an important pillar of
entrepreneurial finance and have become an important source of funding in recent years (Kerr et al., 2014; Hellmann and Thiele,
2015). (3) Venture capital funds (VCs) are the best-researched investor type in entrepreneurial finance. Here, VCs serve as an im-
portant benchmark in order to be able to understand and classify differences between VCs and other investor types. (4) Growth equity
funds (GEFs) constitute an investor type that is particularly crucial in later-stage financing (Gompers et al., 2016a; Ritter, 2015). (5)
Leveraged buyout funds (LBOs) constitute our final investor type (e.g., Cumming et al., 2007). In a leveraged buyout, a company is
acquired by an investment firm using a relatively small portion of equity and a relatively large portion of outside debt financing
(Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009).
We make the following contributions. First, we identify the relative importance of PE investors' investment criteria. Overall, the
most important investment criteria are (1) revenue growth, (2) value-added of product/service, and (3) management team track
record. International scalability, current profitability, business model, and the reputation of existing investors are relevant but of
lower importance. The main aspect investigated by previous studies is, arguably, the importance placed on the management team
(the “jockey”, in Kaplan et al., 2009) relative to the business model (the “horse”). Although the team has been recognized as
important in some studies about VC preferences (e.g., Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004), Kaplan et al. (2009) argue that, in theory, VCs
1 As PE deals involve at least two parties, selection effects pertain to both the PE investor and the entrepreneur sides of the market. Although the
source of deal flow – and the related matching process – is a relevant aspect in the analysis of PE (Schwienbacher, 2007, 2013; Sørensen, 2007), we
focus on PE investment criteria in this study. However, we acknowledge that these criteria might be influenced by entrepreneurial choices among
different funding sources.
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should place more weight on business models than on management teams since companies' business lines remain stable while
management turnover is substantial. Recently, Gompers et al. (2016b) report that 95% of the VCs in their survey mention the
management team as an important factor, 47% as the most important factor. Similarly, the experiment by Bernstein et al. (2017)
reveals that BAs are highly responsive to information about the founding team, whereas information about traction and current
investors does not lead to significantly increased interest. Adding to this discussion, we find that the management team is an im-
portant investment criterion for our participants. However, we also find that investors rate revenue growth and the value-added
provided by the company's product or service to be more important than the management team's track record.
Second, we contribute to prior research by comparing the importance of the respective investment criteria across different in-
vestor types. While previous literature has suggested that considerable differences in the decision-making of different investor types
likely exist (Lerner et al., 2007), a systematic empirical assessment of these differences is absent. Further adding to this literature, we
incorporate FOs as an investor type that prior corporate finance literature has largely neglected. Recent practitioners' reports show
that while the fraction of investments by FOs in real estate has decreased over the last decade, direct equity investments have almost
doubled (Bloomberg, 2014). Considering that the 50 largest FOs account for assets under management of approximately 1000 $b
(Bloomberg, 2014), research on the assessment of investments by FOs is both highly timely and relevant. Our study sheds light on the
investment criteria of FOs and finds that, relative to other PE investors, FOs attribute greater importance to the profitability of
portfolio companies but less importance to revenue growth. An explanation is that by undertaking risky decisions, the managers of
FOs risk losing family wealth and jeopardize the financial and social wellbeing of future family generations. They are therefore more
concerned with the conservation of irreplaceable capital through investments in already profitable companies, rather than bearing
the risk – and potentially high returns – of high-growth companies.
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the research design, including the sample, the descriptive
statistics about the different types of investors considered in this study, and the conjoint analysis. Section 3 discusses the results of the
study. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. Research design
2.1. Data and sample
We identified investors and investment professionals in Pitchbook, which is one of the most comprehensive databases in en-
trepreneurial finance and is regularly used for research in the field of PE investments (e.g., Kaplan and Lerner, 2016; Paglia and
Harjoto, 2014). The information provided in Pitchbook is mainly based on disclosed information from limited partners, filings of
national regulators, and other available public information. The advantage of Pitchbook relative to alternative data sources is that it
reports information on investors' teams as well as their (individual) contact details, in addition to information on the investment
entity (Brown et al., 2015). We used this information to create our sample of investors and investment professionals, which we
identified in 2016.
We first filtered Pitchbook by investor type (i.e., funds), selecting all investment entities classified as a VC fund, FO, buyout fund,
or GEF, including multiple investor types. Second, we only considered investors that had done at least one equity deal in the last ten
years (as of 2016) that was classified as series A, B, C, D (or later), or expansion. This was done to ensure that participants in the
experiment actually had some experience with regard to PE investments. Third, we identified every investment professional in
Pitchbook working for these investment entities and removed those who had missing values with regard to e-mail and/or location.
This approach led to the identification of 15,600 investment professionals which we invited via email to participate in our
research. We sent a total of three reminders over five months and collected 749 responses (response rate= 6.24%) in total. We asked
participants about the type of investor they work for as Pitchbook's classification can contain multiple classifications per investor. For
example, an investor could be classified as a VC and FO simultaneously. Out of the 749 respondents, 59 (7.9%) worked for FOs, 20
(2.7%) for or as BAs, 396 (52.9%) for VCs, 189 (25.2%) for GEFs, and 85 (11.3%) for LBOs. In line with previous studies (e.g.,
Graham and Harvey, 2001), the experiment was run as an anonymous survey as data collected about investment behavior is sensitive
and anonymity is required to fully comply with the latest data security legislation (EU-GDPR/18 General Data Protection Regulation).
To assess the representativeness of our sample, we first compare the participants in our experiment to the population of investors
retrieved from Pitchbook. Overall, the representation of each investor type in our experiment is similar to the distribution of investor
types in the full sample, as illustrated in Table 1.2
To assess the representativeness of our sample, we test for non-response bias by comparing participants to non-participants (e.g.,
Armstrong and Overton, 1977). The results are displayed in Table 2, which reports the mean values of the population retrieved from
Pitchbook (N=15,600), our final sample (N=749), and a z-test for differences between these mean values. The difference between
these mean values is in most cases not statistically significant. For example, most of our participants (87.8%) are male with a slightly
higher percentage relative to the percentage of males in the initial Pitchbook population (85.8%). Minor differences exist with regard
to the respondents' position in the company. In the initial population, 49.3% were partners or CEOs (51.8% in the final sample),
22.8% (19.6%) were directors or principals, 14.9% (16.5%) were investment managers, and 12.4% (12.0%) worked as analysts.
2 The fractions obtained from Pitchbook are slightly biased downwards because 23.9% of the investors are coded as “multiple investor types”. In
our survey, these individuals assigned themselves to the type that fit best. For example, the full population in Pitchbook contained 52.2% VCs, while
our sample includes 52.9% VC.
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Table 2 also reports the geographical distribution, with a general consistency between the initial Pitchbook population and the
sample of participants. While 57.1% of the individuals in the population are located in Europe, 60.7% of the final participants are
Europeans. The percentage of African investment professionals is significantly higher in our sample as compared to the population.
However, they constitute still a small proportion of the final sample (0.9%). We, therefore, conclude that a non-response bias should
not influence our results in a major way (e.g., Graham and Harvey, 2001).
Table 1
Sample selection and representativeness.
This table compares the composition of the population of 15,600 investors in Pitchbook with our
sample of 749 participants that took part in our experiment. The initial population was first filtered
from Pitchbook by investor type (i.e., funds). Investors needed to be classified as a venture capital
fund, corporate venture capital fund, family office, buyout fund, or growth equity fund. As a second
requirement, we considered only investors that had done at least one equity deal in the last ten years
(as of 2016) that was classified as series A, B, C, D (or later), or expansion. Third, we identified every
individual investor (= person) listed in Pitchbook working for these investors and removed those
individuals who had missing values with regard to e-mail and/or location. This approach led to the
identification of 15,600 individual investors which we invited via email to participate in our research.
We sent a total of three reminders letters over five months. In total, we collected 749 responses
(response rate= 6.24%). We asked participants about the type of investor they work for (self-se-
lection) as Pitchbook's classifications can contain multiple classifications per investor. For example,
an investor could be classified as a VC and FO simultaneously.
Panel A: Pitchbook population
Investor type N (%)
Venture capital fund 8149 (52.2%)
Private equity companies 3214 (20.6%)
Family office 503 (3.2%)
Multiple investor types 3734 (23.9%)
Total 15,600 (100%)
Panel B: Our sample of participants
Investor type N (%)
Venture capital fund 396 (52.9%)
Growth equity fund 189 (25.2%)
Leveraged buyout fund 85 (11.3%)
Family office 59 (7.9%)
Business angel 20 (2.7%)
Total 749 (100%)
Table 2
Assessment of a potential non-response bias.
To assess whether a non-response bias potentially influences our results, we compare our initial sample (N=15,600) to our final sample
(N=749) along with several characteristics that were recorded in Pitchbook. The first column reports the mean values of the initial population. The
second column reports the mean values of our final sample. The final column reports the difference between the mean values along with the
significance of z-tests for proportions. Significant values indicate statistically significant differences. * < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Variable (1) Initial population (N=15,600) (2) Final sample (N=749) (1) vs. (2)
Gender
Male 0.858 0.878 0.020
Position in company
Partner or CEO 0.493 0.518 0.025
Director or principal 0.228 0.196 −0.032*
Investment manager 0.149 0.165 0.016
Analyst 0.124 0.120 −0.004
Location of investment company
Europe 0.571 0.607 0.036*
Asia 0.079 0.098 0.019*
Africa 0.004 0.009 0.005***
North America 0.280 0.246 −0.034*
South America 0.033 0.020 −0.013*
Oceania 0.031 0.018 −0.013*
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We assess a potential late-response bias, which is present if early participants in the experiment show significantly different
characteristics and behavior than late participants (Graham and Harvey, 2001). To assess this bias, we split the final sample into early
participants (first half of the respondents, N=375) and late participants (second half of the respondents, N=374) and compare
their mean values with regard to individual characteristics using a t-test. The results are reported in Table 3. For example, the results
show that 85.5% of the early participants were male, while 90.3% of the late participants were male. This indicates that females were
slightly under-represented among late respondents. Also, early participants were slightly more experienced than late respondents. No
significant differences exist with regard to the variables age, tenure, education, entrepreneurial experience, position in the company,
or work experience. Thus, the results indicate that no major differences exist between early and late participants.
As in all studies, external validity might be a concern. Fortunately, previous research provides considerable evidence for the
external validity of conjoint studies (e.g. Louviere, 1988; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2018). These studies generally show that the
estimated decision behavior with conjoint experiments strongly correlates with real observed behavior. Shepherd and Zacharakis
(2018) recommend that conjoint tasks should be representative of the participant's real tasks in order to ensure external validity. To
ensure this, we conducted a pretest with experienced PE investors, who confirmed that our selection of attributes and attribute levels
is an appropriate portrayal of their actual investment decisions.
Among the different types of investors, FOs might be particularly prone to concerns of external validity, as they have received
scant attention in previous research. To assess the external validity of our sample of FOs, we refer to the Global Family Office Report
(2018), which is one of the most established surveys on FOs to date. The Global Family Office Report (2018) provides information
based on a sample of 311 FOs that can be used as a reference point for our sample. The Global Family Office Report (2018) shows that
the most prevalent stages in which FOs invest (PE funds and direct investments) are growth stages (72%) and venture stages (57%).
These values are similar to our sample, in which 73% of the FOs indicate to invest in growth stages and 66% in early stages. A
distinguishing feature is that FOs, compared to the other investor types in our sample, are smaller with regard to assets under
management. This is somewhat surprising as reports frequently describe FOs as extremely wealthy investors, whose assets under
management revolve around 1,000 $m on average (e.g., Economist, 2018). The GFOR similarly reports a mean value of 808 $m,
while most of the FOs in our sample report assets under management between 100 and 250 $m. However, these reports also
acknowledge a large variety across FOs. Unfortunately, the distribution of assets under management is not reported in the GFOR so
that it is difficult to conclude whether our sample is biased downwards. With regard to syndication, the GFOR indicates that FOs tend
to make co-investments instead of investing alone. Similar, FOs in our sample express a strong preference for syndication. Finally, the
GFOR indicates that 38% of the FOs are headquartered in Europe, 34% in North America, 28% in the rest of the world. This indicates
that European FOs are overrepresented in our sample, constituting 60% of the participants (25% North America, 15% rest of the
world).
2.2. Descriptive statistics
Each participant in the experiment was asked to fill out a questionnaire with questions on characteristics of the investment entity
in which they work, characteristics of the portfolio companies, and their individual characteristics. The following subsections provide
a descriptive overview of the sample and highlight the particularities of each investor type. First, Table 4 provides the definition of
the variables and descriptive statistics for the full sample. The average investment professional in our sample manages between 100
and 250 $m with a target internal rate of return between 10% and 20%. About one fourth of the participants invest alone, about one
half invest with one or more other investors, while the remaining one fourth is indifferent to syndication. Most of the participants in
Table 3
Assessment of a potential late-response bias.
To assess whether a late-response bias potentially influences our results, we compare the first half of our participants (N= 375) to the second half
of our respondents (N=374) along individual characteristics. The first column reports the mean values of the first half of the respondents. The
second column reports the mean values of the second half of the participants. The final column reports the difference between the mean values along
with the significance of t-tests. Significant values indicate statistically significant differences. All variables are defined in Table 4. * < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Variable (1) First half (N= 375) (2) Second half (N=374) (1) vs. (2)
Gender 0.858 0.903 −0.045*
Age 3.333 3.211 0.122
Experience as investor 11.690 10.470 1.220*
Tenure 7.152 6.796 0.355
Education: law 0.058 0.061 −0.002
Education: business/economics 0.776 0.794 −0.018
Education: natural sciences 0.114 0.098 0.015
Education: engineering 0.250 0.221 0.028
Entrepreneurial experience 0.512 0.502 0.009
Position in the company 1.850 1.925 −0.074
Work experience: startups/SMEs 0.245 0.288 −0.043
Work experience: large companies and startups/SMEs 0.389 0.382 0.006
Work experience: large companies 0.365 0.328 0.036
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the experiment are based in Europe. Coherently, most of the investment companies in which they invest are European. The main
industry of their portfolio companies is software and services. The average investment professional is male (88%), between 35 and
45 years old with 11 years of experience as investor. The educational background of most participants (79%) is business and eco-
nomics.
Table 5 provides an initial comparison of the investor types using the variables described in Table 4. Specifically, Table 5 outlines
the differences in the mean values across the different investor types included in our sample. While the first column depicts the mean
values of the full sample (N=749 participants), the following columns refer to the respective investor types. The signs in brackets
(+/−) indicate whether the respective mean value is significantly larger (+) or smaller (−) than the mean value of the remaining
sample. A t-test indicates whether the respective mean value differs from the mean value of the remaining sample. The final column
reports the significance levels obtained from an analysis of variance (ANOVA), indicating statistically significant differences across
the different investor groups. The results for each investor type are described in detail in the following subsections.
2.2.1. Family offices (FOs)
Our sample includes 59 FOs. Overall, Table 5 illustrates that the FOs in our sample do not have many characteristics in which they
significantly differ from the other investor types in our sample, making a nuanced profiling difficult. For example, the results show
that FOs invest in portfolio companies of all stages: 31% of the sampled FOs invest in seed-stage portfolio companies, 66% in early-
stage, 73% in growth−/expansion-stage, and 25% in later-stage portfolio companies. Further information on FO's investment
portfolios is provided in the GFOR, which outlines that direct equity investments (in developed and developing markets) make up
28.0% of FO's portfolio and outlines that 50% of FOs intend to invest more in PE direct investments in the future.
A distinguishing feature is that FOs, compared to the other investor types in our sample, are smaller with regard to assets under
management and company size as measured by their number of investment professionals. This is somewhat surprising: While em-
pirical academic research on FOs is virtually non-existent, practice-oriented reports frequently describe FOs as extremely wealthy
investors, whose assets under management revolve around 1,000 $m on average (e.g., Economist, 2018). However, these reports also
acknowledge a large variety across FOs.
Another distinguishing characteristic is that FOs' investment professionals tend to have more experience than those working for
other investors, as they have, on average, worked as an investment professional for 13.5 years. Also, investment professionals from
FOs have a comparatively high degree of work experience from working in startups or small and medium enterprises (SMEs).
However, these investment professionals are not necessarily founders themselves as their own entrepreneurial experience is not
significantly different from the remaining sample.
2.2.2. Business angels (BAs)
Our sample comprises 20 BAs, which is the least prevalent group of participants. BAs represent the smallest investor type with
regard to assets under management and company size. This is due to the fact that BAs are often individual investors that invest their
own money and frequently make smaller investments than other investor types (Lerner, 1998; Hellmann and Thiele, 2015). Also, our
data reflects that BAs tend to invest in very early-stage companies: 70% of the sampled BAs invest in the seed stage, which is the
highest value among all investor types. Simultaneously, BAs are less likely to invest in growth- or later-stage companies when
compared with the other investor types (Hellmann and Thiele, 2015). Investing in very early stages involves a comparatively high
degree of uncertainty. One way to reduce this uncertainty and to mitigate investment risk is to engage in syndication (Block et al.,
2019; Lerner, 1994). Compared to other participants, the sampled BAs have a strong preference to engage in syndication with
multiple other investors, which is in line with prior research (e.g., Block et al., 2019; Manigart et al., 2006). Also, investing in very
early stages can lead to potentially large payoffs, in a high-risk high-reward fashion. This risky investment strategy corresponds to the
fact that BAs report to have achieved a significantly higher share of investments with cash-on-cash multiples larger than factor 10.
With regard to individual characteristics, BAs are older than investment professionals in other investor types and more often have
entrepreneurial experience. Again, these findings are in line with previous research which regularly describes BAs as experienced
individuals that often possess substantial entrepreneurship experience (e.g., Collewaert and Manigart, 2016). Often, previous en-
trepreneurial activities are one of the sources of BAs funds.
2.2.3. Venture capital funds (VCs)
VCs represent the largest group of investors in our sample (N=396). While VCs are larger than FOs and BAs with regard to assets
under management and company size, they are significantly smaller than GEFs and LBOs. This is in line with prior research by
Gompers et al. (2016a), who point out that GEFs and LBOs are typically larger than VCs. Also, prior research indicates that VCs are
very risk-prone, which is reflected in (potentially) large and volatile returns (e.g., Cochrane, 2005). This is reflected in our descriptive
statistics: While VCs have a significantly higher share of investments that achieve low cash-on-cash multiples than the other investor
types, they also report a significantly higher share of investments with very high cash multiples.
Our descriptive statistics confirm that VCs prefer to invest more in early stages and less in later stages than other investor types.
For example, 85% of the participants indicated that they invest in early-stage companies while only 9% indicated that they (also)
invest in later-stage companies. However, VCs do not have a preference for seed-stage investments that is as pronounced as for BAs.
Like BAs, VCs have a general preference for syndication with one or multiple investors. Again, syndication is frequently used as a
strategy to mitigate risk, especially in early-stage investments that contain a high degree of uncertainty (Gompers et al., 2016a).
With regard to individual characteristics of the investment professionals, participants working for VCs had less experience
working as investors, less often had a business education, and more often had a background in natural sciences or engineering as
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compared to the remaining sample. Also, participants working for VCs reported high levels of entrepreneurial experience (second
only to BAs) and a high amount of work experience from startups or SMEs instead of large companies.
2.2.4. Growth equity funds (GEFs)
Our sample contains 189 participants from GEFs. With regard to both assets under management and number of investments
professionals, GEFs are significantly larger than FOs, BAs, and VCs. This is in line with prior research by Gompers et al. (2016a) and
Ritter (2015), who state that GEFs tend to be larger than most VCs but usually smaller than LBOs. GEFs constitute an investor type
that is particularly crucial in later-stage financing (Gompers et al., 2016a; Ritter, 2015). This is reflected in our descriptive statistics,
which show that a significantly higher fraction of GEFs invests in later stages as compared to other investors. In particular, 91% stated
that they invest in growth‐/expansion-stage portfolio companies.
Later-stage investments generally entail a lower investment risk (Gompers et al., 2016a; Ritter, 2015). This is because, at that
stage, companies typically have a functioning product and business model and have experienced initial market success. Moreover,
company performance measures are more readily available and can be used as investment criteria. The lower investment risk in later-
stage deals corresponds to less volatility in investment returns (Cochrane, 2005). In contrast to other PE investors, GEFs achieve a
significantly smaller fraction of investments with low cash-on-cash multiples and a significantly higher ratio of cash multiples be-
tween 2 and 5 (48% of their investments). Also, since syndication is a means to reduce investment risk, GEFs tend to engage less in
syndication and more often invest alone as compared to the other investor types.
GEFs primarily invest in growth- and expansion-stage companies. This specialization is also reflected in individual-level statistics.
For example, own entrepreneurial experience of the investment professional may be less important when investing in later-stage
companies compared to investing in early-stage ventures. Compared to the early-stage investor types in our sample, individuals
working in GEFs indeed have less often own entrepreneurial experience and work experience from working in startups or SMEs versus
work experience from large companies. Finally, they more often have a business education, which may be useful when it comes to
scaling instead of developing business models.
2.2.5. Leveraged buyout funds (LBOs)
Our sample contains 85 participants from LBOs, which represent the largest investor type in terms of assets under management
and number of investment professionals. This is in line with prior research, which frequently highlights LBOs as an important asset
class being substantially larger than other types of PE investors (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Metrick and Yasuda, 2010).
Typically, LBOs invest in mature companies. This is different from investors like VCs and BAs, which typically invest in young or
emerging companies (e.g., Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009; Metrick and Yasuda, 2010). Indeed, our descriptive statistics show that the
share of seed- and early-stage investments is significantly smaller with LBOs than with other investor types, whereas the fraction of
investments in later-stage companies is significantly larger. For investments in mature companies investment uncertainty is lower.
Our results reflect this, as LBOs tend to engage in syndication less often than other investors; 67% of LBOs prefer to invest alone. The
lower likelihood of syndication may also be related to LBO's large size, which makes syndication less necessary in order to raise large
funding volumes. Cochrane (2005) finds that later-stage deals have less volatility than early-stage deals with regard to returns. This is
reflected in LBOs' investment success: With regard to cash-on-cash multiples, LBOs have significantly lower ratios of very low and
very high multiples and report significantly more often multiples of average size. 85% of their investments achieve multiples between
1 and 5.
Finally, prior studies acknowledge that LBOs create value through significant managerial improvements (Kaplan and Strömberg,
2009; Rigamonti et al., 2016). However, more mature companies already possess management skills so that LBOs are required to
provide a different set of supporting activities than VCs do. Metrick and Yasuda (2010) find that LBO investors build on their prior
experience by increasing the size of their funds faster than VCs do. They also describe that LBO investors add value to extremely large
companies, whereas VC'scan add value primarily to small companies. This has implications for individuals working for LBOs. As
reflected in our descriptive statistics, individual's working for LBOs have less entrepreneurial experience and have more often gained
work experience in larger companies as compared to individuals working for other investor types. This set of experiences makes them
well suited to developing large companies.
2.3. Experimental design of the conjoint analysis
As the main part of our study, we conduct an experimental conjoint analysis to elicit the decision-making behavior of PE investors.
This technique requires participants to make a series of assessments based on a fixed set of attributes. With this approach, decision
criteria can be measured conjointly in a multivariate way, allowing a more accurate representation of the actual decision behavior
and the underlying preference structure. This approach is frequently used in the context of investor decision-making due to the
limitations of post hoc approaches such as questionnaires and interviews (e.g., Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1999). For example, in-
formation is collected as the decision is being made, whereas post-hoc methods collect data about a decision after the decision has
been made. Therefore, conjoint studies overcome limitations that affect post hoc approaches, such as a self-reporting or recall bias.
Relatedly, conjoint experiments come closer to the investor's actual decision-making scenario. Usually, PE investors assess companies
holistically and evaluate multiple criteria simultaneously. This involves making trade-offs between different criteria. These tradeoffs
can be captured with conjoint approaches. Recently, Bernstein et al. (2017) used a similar experimental approach to assess the
importance of startup characteristics to investors in early-stage companies. In contrast to Bernstein et al. (2017), we are particularly
interested in how the importance of investment criteria varies across different investor types.
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We use a choice-based conjoint analysis (CBC) in which objects (here: companies) that consist of several attributes (here: revenue
growth, profitability, reputation of current investors, etc.) are evaluated by participants (here: investment professionals). Participants
are asked to make a deterministic investment decision between several hypothetical portfolio companies that differ only in the
specifications of the company attributes (e.g., 20% revenue growth for company 1 versus 50% revenue growth for company 2). Before
asking the participants to make a series of decisions on such hypothetical entrepreneurial companies, participants were provided with
information on the study and the decision tasks that they were going to face. An important advantage of our experimental setting is
that we were able to provide respondents with a very detailed description of the (hypothetical) companies they were going to assess
in the conjoint experiment. To ensure that the participants in our experiment were thinking about similar (or the same) company
when making their investment decision, we included an introductory slide outlining our understanding of the hypothetical com-
panies. They were told that they would be confronted with two different companies that are in a stage of early growth or expansion
and we clarified that companies have market traction, a validated business model, multiple paying customers, growth in sales and
customers, and multiple employees. To avoid conflicts with the generic screening criteria of investors, the presented companies were
said to match the geographical, industrial and investment size preferences of the participants (Franke et al., 2008).
To identify a list of typical screening criteria used by PE investors, we proceeded in two steps. First, we derived a list of possible
criteria from prior research (e.g., Bernstein et al., 2017; Franke et al., 2008; Puri and Zarutskie, 2012). Second, we conducted 19
expert interviews with PE investors from Europe and the US to identify the most relevant criteria used by different investor types.
These experts represent several investor types (e.g., VCs, FOs, GEFs). The interviews were transcribed and coded by two researchers
to identify the most relevant criteria, which formed the basis of the conjoint study.3 Based on this procedure, we derived a list of
company attributes and attribute levels. The identified attributes are (1) profitability, (2) revenue growth, (3) track record of the
management team, (4) reputation of current investors, (5) business model, (6) value-added of product/service, and (7) international
scalability. These attributes or investment criteria are in line with and extend criteria mentioned in previous research, such as
Bernstein et al. (2017). Our business model measure is based on the work of Amit and Zott (2001). Table 6 provides a detailed
description of our operationalization of these criteria as well as their respective levels. In addition to the attributes, Table 6 also
outlines the respective attribute levels and their descriptions. For example, the attribute “revenue growth” comprised the attribute
levels “10% p.a.”, “20% p.a.”, “50% p.a.”, and “100% p.a”. All descriptions outlined in Table 6 were also shown to the participants in
our conjoint experiment.
Since PE investors assess potential investments holistically, we employ a full-profile CBC, which means that all attributes from
Table 6 are presented to investors at once. CBC is used in conjunction with a reduced conjoint design (Chrzan and Orme, 2000), as
participants would be exposed to too many decision tasks if combinations between all possible variations of attribute levels were
presented. Furthermore, the experimental design is asymmetric because the number of attribute levels across attributes is not equal.4
We created 800 different experimental designs, with each presenting a different sequence of choice tasks with different combinations
of attribute levels. Each design consists of the 7 attributes outlined in Table 6 whose levels were randomly assigned to two investment
opportunities. Each participant was asked to select one of the two alternatives in 15 choice tasks. While 13 of these tasks were
randomly assigned, 2 were the same for all participants. These “fixed” tasks were used to determine the test-retest reliability of the
participants' choices in the study. Fig. 1 provides an illustration of a choice task that each participant faced 15 times with varying
attribute levels. On average, each choice task took the participants 21 s to complete, which is in line with other research (Johnson and
Orme, 1996).
CBC studies can suffer from three types of order effects (Chrzan, 1994), which we account for: (1) the order of choice tasks, (2) the
order of options in a choice task, and (3) the order of attributes within a choice task. To circumvent the effect of the choice task order,
we created 800 different experimental designs with the choice tasks within each design being randomly ordered. To avoid the effect
of the order of options in a given choice task, the two options within the 800 different experimental designs were randomly ordered
within the respective choice tasks. To circumvent the effect of the order of attributes within a choice task, the order presented to
participants is randomized across participants but kept stable within one participant. In addition, the participants are randomly
allocated to one of the 800 experimental designs. Also, we conducted a pre-test with four experienced investors and four researchers
who had previously conducted research on investor decision-making to confirm the face validity of both the attributes as well as the
complexity and number of the choice tasks. The two fixed tasks were used to check the test-retest reliability of the participants'
choices in the study. By assessing the utilities from the 13 random choice tasks to predict the two fixed choice tasks, a proxy for test-
retest reliability can be estimated.5 In our study, this method leads to an 80% accuracy of correct classification.
Finally, to explore the importance attached to the different investment criteria, we performed multilevel logistic regression
models. The investment decision made by the investment professionals serves as the binary dependent variable (1 if the investor
chose the respective portfolio company; 0 if he did not), while the different attribute levels constitute our independent variables. We
use a multilevel regression because our observations of investment decisions are nested and effects on multiple levels (particularly
cross-level interactions) are evaluated at the same time. Two levels exist within our data: multiple decisions (level one) are nested
within each individual (level two) and cannot be viewed as independent from each other.
3 We triangulated the findings from the interviews with archival data such as the investor's websites and with informal expert interviews.
4 The experimental design is a balanced-overlapping approach with a fractional asymmetric design, which is a frequently employed design
strategy for CBC studies (e.g., Chrzan and Orme, 2000).
5 The utility estimates from the 12 random choice task are computed with a hierarchical Bayesian model and then used as covariates in a logit
regression on the holdout task choices.
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3. Results
In this section, we present the results of our analysis in three steps. First, we show and discuss the relative importance of the
different investment criteria. Then, we compare the importance of the decision criteria across investor types. Last, we apply a
propensity score methodology as a robustness check.
3.1. Relative importance of investment criteria
Table 7 reports the results of the regression analysis. Model 1 uses the full sample while Models 2–6 consider each investor type
separately. The coefficients indicate the importance investors attach to each criterion.
Model 1 shows that all included attribute levels significantly influence the decision of the investor (p < 0.001) with the ex-
ception of the attribute level current investors – unfamiliar. Participants were found to be indifferent between the absence of current
investors and the presence of current investors that are unfamiliar to them. However, investors significantly favor the presence of
reputable investors over their lack of presence.
The results displayed in Table 7 also indicate which criteria are considered as most important by participants in their investment
decisions. The effect sizes of the attribute levels for revenue growth are particularly high. Companies with a revenue growth rate of
100% p.a. have an odds-ratio (OR) of 4.86, indicating that these companies have a 4.86 times higher chance of a positive screening
decision (selection) by an investor relative to companies with a 10% growth rate. Overall, revenue growth is the most important
investment criterion for the participants in our sample. The second most important criterion is a high value-added of the product/
service (OR of 4.25) and the third most important criterion is the track record of the management team where the odds-ratio of all team
members having a relevant track record is estimated at 3.27, indicating a 3.27 times higher chance of a positive screening decision of
the investors relative to companies with a management team without relevant track record.
To further illustrate the weight attached to each criterion, we estimate the relative importance of each attribute following Franke
et al. (2008). The values displayed in Fig. 2 allow an assessment of how strong a change in an attribute's level does affect the total
Table 6
Attributes and attribute levels used in our conjoint analysis.
This table describes and defines the attributes and attribute levels presented to participants in our conjoint analysis. We use a choice-based-
conjoint (CBC) analysis, in which the participants are presented with investment opportunities and are asked to select the one company that better
matches their preferences. The two companies are only described in terms of the attributes displayed in this table (“attributes”) and only differ from
each other in the respective specification of these criteria (“attribute levels”).
Attribute Attribute levels Attribute description
(1) Profitability
(3 levels, ordinal)
1. Not profitable
2. Break-even
3. Profitable
Describes the current profitability of the company.
(2) Revenue growth
(4 levels, ordinal)
1. 10% p.a.
2. 20% p.a.
3. 50% p.a.
4. 100% p.a.
Represents the company's average yearly revenue growth rate over the last years.
(3) Track record management
team
(3 levels, ordinal)
1. None of them
2. Some of them
3. All of them
Describes whether the management team has a relevant track record (e.g., industry
experience or leadership experience).
(4) Current investors
(3 levels, nominal)
1. No other current external investors
2. Other current external investor -
Unfamiliar
3. Other current external investor -
Tier 1
Describes the type of current investor, if any.
(5) Business model
(4 levels, nominal)
1. Lock-in
2. Innovation-centered
3. Low cost
4. Complementary offering
Describes the key focus of the business model of the company:
1. Lock-in: Business model that keeps customers attracted and “locked-in”, having
high switching costs for customers, which prevent them from changing to other
providers.
2. Innovation-centered: Business model that offers innovation in the form of new
technology, products or services.
3. Low cost: Business model focusing on reducing costs for customers for already
existing products or services.
4. Complementary offering: Business model that bundles multiple goods or services
to generate more value for customers.
(6) Value-added of product/
service
(3 levels, ordinal)
1. Low
2. Medium
3. High
Describes the value added for the customer through the product or service. Low
value-added represents a marginal improvement (e.g., in cost-reduction or service
quality), whereas high value-added represents significant improvements.
(7) International scalability
(3 levels, ordinal)
1. Easy
2. Moderate
3. Difficult
Describes the difficulty of scaling the company internationally, in terms of the time
and investment needed.
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utility of a proposed company. The higher the value, the higher the contribution of the respective attribute to the company's total
utility value. To enable a better comparison, the values are normalized so that the sum of all importance values yields 100. Overall,
the chance of a positive screening decision is strongly affected by high values in the attributes of (1) revenue growth, (2) value-added
of product/service, and (3) management track record; the design of the business model and the type of existing investors are relevant
but are of lower importance. The same is true for the ease of scaling the company internationally and profitability.
3.2. Differences across investor types
Table 7 also includes a dedicated model for each investor type in which we perform a subsample analysis (Models 2–6). The odds
ratios enable an initial comparison of the investment criteria's importance for each investor type and provide insights on the re-
levance of each attribute. For example, the OR of 7.071 for participants from LBOs with regard to profitability is considerably higher
than the OR of 2.460 for the whole sample. This indicates that being profitable is a much more important criterion for LBOs than for
other investor types. However, a comparison of the ORs does not shed light on whether these differences across investor types are
statistically significant.
To address this issue, Table 8 estimates separate regressions where the importance of investment criteria for each investor type is
tested against the rest of the sample. For example, Model 1 of Table 8 compares the effect of FOs against the combined group of BAs,
VCs, GEFs, and LBOs. As such, the coefficients displayed are interaction effects that enable a statement on whether the importance of
each criterion differs significantly from the rest of the sample, enabling statements as to where each investor type stands out from the
other investors. The following paragraphs refer to the respective models for each investor type.
3.2.1. Investment criteria of family offices (FOs)
Model 1 of Table 8 compares FO's investment criteria to the investment criteria of the other investor types. The results show that
FOs differ with regard to the importance attached to profitability and revenue growth. In particular, FOs consider profitability
significantly more important than other investor types and attach significantly less importance to high levels of revenue growth. No
significant differences emerge regarding the remaining investment criteria.
Fig. 1. Exemplary choice task presented to participants. In this choice task, every participant was asked to select the company that presents a more
attractive investment opportunity for him. Each participant was presented with 15 different choice tasks. While the seven attributes of the com-
panies were fixed throughout these choice tasks (e.g., “current investors”, “international scalability”), the attribute levels (e.g., “external investors –
unfamiliar to you”, “easy”) were varied across choice tasks in a random manner (we performed a choice-based conjoint analysis with a reduced
design). All attributes and attribute levels are described in Table 6.
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An explanation for the distinct preference of profitability lies in the fact that financial goals are likely to be different for FOs
relative to other investors. While the return on investment is naturally important, it is intermingled with objectives of wealth pre-
servation. FOs, whose goals are determined by the families to which they belong or for which they work, are often conservative and
risk-averse and thus more reluctant to pursue high-risk investments (Wessel et al., 2014). By undertaking risky decisions, the
managers of FOs risk losing family wealth and jeopardize the financial and social wellbeing of future family generations. They are
therefore more concerned with the conservation of irreplaceable capital, often accumulated over generations, rather than potential
high returns. Indeed, the mission of FOs is to protect and preserve assets for future generations. A survey by Bloomberg (2017) finds
that the main objective of FOs is intergenerational wealth management. Since companies with poor profitability are associated with a
high risk of bankruptcy (Agarwal and Taffler, 2008), FOs will consider such investments to be high-risk investments. Therefore, they
will tend to avoid such investments, explaining our findings.
Similarly, while current profitability reflects an investment associated with lower risk, high growth potentially incurs uncertainty,
as it exposes entrepreneurial companies to additional challenges and risks (e.g., from entering new markets and hiring new em-
ployees) (Perez-Quiros and Timmermann, 2000). Adding to this, our descriptive statistics indicate that FOs are not as resourceful as
other PE investors. From a resource-based perspective, FOs are thus disadvantaged with regard to monitoring and providing support
to their portfolio companies. This disadvantage is particularly relevant in the case of high-growth companies. Monitoring and sup-
porting high-growth companies is typically very challenging and resource intensive.
3.2.2. Investment criteria of business angels (BAs)
Model 2 of Table 8 focusses on BAs. A particularity of BA's investment decisions is that they focus less on profitability than other
investors. An explanation is that BAs primarily invest in early-stage companies (Hellmann and Thiele, 2015), which involves a
comparatively high degree of uncertainty. In these companies, profitability is of minor importance as they are often not mature
enough to achieve profits. Having achieved profitability, in turn, is a sign of a healthy business model and a strong competitive
position. Typical companies targeted by BAs still need to achieve legitimacy by proving that their products fulfill market needs and
provide value to their customers. In this regard, revenue growth can be perceived as a sign of market acceptance.
Additionally, BAs prefer not to invest in companies with business models that keep customers “locked-in”, such as those having
high switching costs to prevent customers from changing to other providers. Relative to other types of investors, BAs disfavor locked-
in business models for innovation-centered or low-cost business models (i.e., focusing on reducing costs for customers for already
existing products or services).
3.2.3. Investment criteria of venture capital funds (VCs)
Model 3 of Table 8 focusses on the investment criteria of VCs. Like BAs and in contrast to the other investor types in our sample,
VCs attribute significantly less importance to profitability. Also, VCs attribute significantly more importance to high levels of revenue
growth. These findings are both in line with prior literature, in which VC investments are generally characterized as high risk and
high growth (Ueda, 2004). For example, Puri and Zarutskie (2012) show that VCs invest in companies with no immediate revenues
and focus on scalability instead of profitability. In our results, this higher scalability is reflected in VC's increased interest in revenue
growth. An explanation is that VCs need to deliver returns to their partners over a relatively short period of time, which incentivizes
them to take riskier investments. The short investment horizon of VC funds and the investors behind them exacerbate the short-
termism of general partners (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004), who are asked to provide high returns by capital providers. All else being
equal, high returns are more difficult to achieve in already profitable companies, whereas the higher risk of entrepreneurial
7.3%
8.3%
11.8%
13.0%
15.7%
20.4%
23.4%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Current investors
Business model
Profitability
International scalability
Track record of management team
Value-added of product/service
Revenue growth
Relative importance (proportion of total utility explained)
Fig. 2. Relative importance of attributes. Calculated based on the coefficients of the main model (Table 5). Reading example: With a relative
importance of 23.4%, investors consider revenue growth to be nearly three times as important as the criterion current investors (relative importance:
7.3%). This value also signifies that the criterion revenue growth accounts for 23.4% of the decision maker's total utility.
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companies is associated with higher chances of high growth rates. In addition, the incentives that principals (limited partners) set for
fund managers (general partners) (i.e., to select investments with the potential to generate high returns) are paralleled at the in-
dividual level. Similar to mutual fund managers, their professional identity stems from their reputation in the market, which is to a
large degree gained and sustained through their investment track record (Chevalier and Ellison, 1999; Kempf and Ruenzi, 2007).
Fund managers who do not provide high returns to their investors will find it hard to secure further funding and suffer from a reduced
labor market value. In addition to monetary returns, other motivations for VC investment professionals involve status and the desire
to outcompete their peers. These motivations are reflected in the characteristics of the entrepreneurial companies that they seek. A
company with high current profitability does not represent the ideal setting for possibly outperforming others and gaining popularity
as a fund manager.
The findings also show that VCs have a preference for funding companies in which tier 1 investors are present. The presence of
reputable investors is a key aspect in VC investments as it allows VC funds to command a premium from future entrepreneurs (Hsu,
2004) and makes future investment fundraising easier (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Nahata, 2008). Moreover, VCs with broader
networks obtain better financial returns (Hochberg et al., 2007) and mitigate risks (Lerner, 1994).
Finally, the results show that VCs prefer innovation-centered business models. Again, this is in line with a strategy that is overall
more risk-prone and focusses on a high-risk high-reward tradeoff.
3.2.4. Investment criteria of growth equity funds (GEFs)
Model 4 of Table 8 focusses on the investment criteria of GEFs. Like FOs and in contrast to BAs and VCs, GEFs attach higher
importance to portfolio companies' profitability. This corresponds to the results of Ritter (2015), who describes that GEFs frequently
invest in companies that are already profitable. Regarding revenue growth, our results show a general preference for revenue growth,
as GEFs consider a revenue growth of 20% or 50% to be more important than other investor types do. Interestingly, GEFs do not seem
to rate a very high revenue growth of 100% to be more important than other investors do. This is a difference to VCs, which differ
from other investors regarding the importance attached to very high levels of revenue growth.
Another peculiarity of GEFs is that they consider it comparably important that all management team members have a relevant
track record. Also, GEFs attach less importance to the presence of reputable investors. An explanation is that the presence of other
investors can generate severe conflicts of interest and agency problems. For example, freeriding behavior can occur, incurring costs
associated with monitoring or sanctioning opportunistic behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The costs associated with co-in-
vesting are higher in the presence of a reputable investor. For example, co-investing generally leads to a higher likelihood of difficult
negotiations between the parties involved (Fried and Hisrich, 1995).
GEFs attach less importance than other investor types to innovation-centered business models and the value-added of a portfolio
company's products and services. An explanation could be that companies with innovation-centered business models as well as high-
value products may serve niche markets and are therefore difficult to grow and scale.
3.2.5. Investment criteria of leveraged buyout funds (LBOs)
Model 5 of Table 8 explores the investment criteria of LBOs in contrast to the other investor types. Like FOs and GEFs, LBOs attach
relatively higher importance to portfolio companies' profitability. The effect is very pronounced and highly significant. In contrast,
LBOs attach a significantly lower importance to revenue growth than other investor types. Regarding the importance of profitability
and revenue growth, LBOs hence present the opposite investor type to VCs. While VCs focus on high scalability of companies (Puri
and Zarutskie, 2012), this indicates that scalability may not be of interest to LBOs. Instead, LBOs are more prone to invest in already
profitable companies, as they are a less risky investment.
LBOs give less importance to the management team as compared to other types of investors. This might be due to their tendency
to replace management teams that they see unfit (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009). Hence, the current management team is considered
less important. Like GEFs, LBOs pay less attention to the presence of reputable investors. As discussed in the previous section, the
presence of reputable investors might make it more difficult for LBOs to pursue their own goals. Finally, similar to GEFs, LBOs attach
lower importance to innovation-centered business models.
3.3. Robustness tests and further analyses
To test the robustness of our results and to further explore these results, we perform a set of robustness checks and additional
analyses, summarized in Table 9. In our main analysis, we compare each investor type against all other investor types included in our
sample. While this comparison highlights the peculiarities of the respective investor's investment criteria in contrast to the other
investor types, we now investigate differences in the importance of investment criteria in selected pairs of investor types. This more
specific analysis allows us to explore differences between specific investor types in a more nuanced way that may have been masked
in the main analysis. Specifically, we conduct a pairwise comparison of the following investor types: FOs vs. VCs (Model 1), FOs vs.
BAs (Model 2), GEFs vs. LBOs (Model 3), and VCs vs. GEFS and LBOs (combined).
In addition, we use propensity score matching to make subsamples comparable in terms of investor and investment professional
characteristics. As these differences might influence investment decisions, we use propensity score matching (PSM) to reduce the
potential bias and to further improve our comparisons across investor types. We match individuals from different investor types
according to their individual characteristics (Table 4, panel C). We use a k-nearest neighbor (KNN) approach with 1-to-1 matching
which matches pairs of observations that are the most related.
J. Block, et al. Journal of Corporate Finance 58 (2019) 329–352
346
Ta
bl
e9
Re
su
lts
of
th
ec
on
joi
nt
an
aly
sis
wi
th
co
mp
ari
so
ns
of
sp
ec
ifi
ci
nv
est
or
typ
es
wi
th
ou
ta
nd
wi
th
pr
op
en
sit
ys
co
re
ma
tch
ing
(P
SM
).
In
th
is
tab
le,
we
foc
us
on
sp
ec
ifi
cc
om
pa
ris
on
sb
etw
ee
ns
ele
cte
di
nv
est
or
typ
es.
Th
et
ab
le
is
co
ns
tru
cte
di
nt
he
sa
me
wa
ya
sT
ab
le
6.
Th
et
ab
le
sh
ow
st
he
res
ult
so
fa
clu
ste
red
log
ist
ic
reg
res
sio
nw
ith
ran
do
m
int
erc
ep
ts
an
dr
an
do
m
slo
pe
s.
Th
ed
ep
en
de
nt
va
ria
ble
is
th
ep
ref
ere
nc
eo
fd
ec
isi
on
ma
ke
ra
nd
th
ei
nd
ep
en
de
nt
va
ria
ble
sa
re
th
ea
ttr
ibu
te
lev
els
de
scr
ibe
di
nT
ab
le
4.
Lo
git
sa
nd
sta
nd
ard
err
or
s
(cl
us
ter
ed
at
th
ed
ec
isi
on
ma
ke
rl
ev
el)
are
dis
pla
ye
d.
Ea
ch
att
rib
ut
el
ev
el
is
int
era
cte
dw
ith
th
er
esp
ec
tiv
ei
nv
est
or
ca
teg
or
y.
Fo
re
xa
mp
le,
in
Mo
de
l1
ae
ve
ry
att
rib
ut
el
ev
el
is
int
era
cte
dw
ith
ad
um
my
va
ria
ble
th
at
tak
es
av
alu
eo
f1
ift
he
res
pe
cti
ve
inv
est
or
wo
rk
ed
in
af
am
ily
offi
ce
,a
nd
0i
ft
he
res
pe
cti
ve
inv
est
or
wo
rk
ed
for
av
en
tu
re
ca
pit
al
fun
d.
Th
em
ain
eff
ec
ts
are
inc
lud
ed
in
th
ee
sti
ma
tio
nb
ut
are
om
itt
ed
for
rea
so
ns
of
br
ev
ity
so
th
at
th
ec
oe
ffi
cie
nt
sd
isp
lay
ed
he
re
on
ly
ref
er
to
int
era
cti
on
eff
ec
ts.
Ho
we
ve
r,
th
em
ain
eff
ec
ts
are
qu
ali
tat
ive
ly
sim
ila
rt
ot
he
eff
ec
ts
dis
pla
ye
di
nT
ab
le
5.
Fo
cu
sin
go
nt
he
int
era
cti
on
eff
ec
ts
en
ab
les
us
to
ide
nt
ify
sig
nifi
ca
nt
diff
ere
nc
es
be
tw
ee
ne
ac
hi
nv
est
or
typ
ev
s.
th
er
em
ain
ing
inv
est
or
typ
es.
Inv
est
or
sw
or
kin
gf
or
ce
rta
in
inv
est
or
typ
es
mi
gh
ts
ign
ifi
ca
nt
ly
diff
er
wi
th
reg
ard
to
ind
ivi
du
al
ch
ara
cte
ris
tic
s.
As
th
ese
diff
ere
nc
es
mi
gh
ti
nfl
ue
nc
ei
nv
est
me
nt
de
cis
ion
s,
we
us
ep
ro
pe
ns
ity
sco
re
ma
tch
ing
(P
SM
)t
or
ed
uc
et
his
po
ten
tia
lb
ias
.W
em
atc
hi
nd
ivi
du
als
fro
m
diff
ere
nt
inv
est
or
typ
es
ac
co
rd
ing
to
th
eir
ind
ivi
du
al
ch
ara
cte
ris
tic
s(
Ta
ble
2,
pa
ne
lC
).
W
eu
se
ak
-ne
are
st
ne
igh
bo
r(
KN
N)
ap
pr
oa
ch
wi
th
1-t
o-1
ma
tch
ing
wh
ich
ma
tch
es
ap
air
of
ob
ser
va
tio
ns
th
at
are
th
em
os
t
rel
ate
d.
W
ec
on
sid
er
fam
ily
offi
ce
s(
FO
s),
bu
sin
ess
an
ge
ls
(B
As
),
ve
nt
ur
ec
ap
ita
lf
un
ds
(V
Cs
),
gr
ow
th
eq
uit
yf
un
ds
(G
EF
s),
an
dl
ev
era
ge
db
uy
ou
tf
un
ds
(L
BO
s).
*<
0.1
0,
**
p
<
0.0
5,
**
*p
<
0.0
1.
Mo
de
l
(1
a)
(1
b)
(2
a)
(2
b)
PS
M
No
PS
M
KN
N
1:
1
PS
M
No
PS
M
KN
N
1:
1
PS
M
Sa
mp
le
FO
s
vs
.V
Cs
FO
s
vs
.V
Cs
FO
s
vs
.B
As
FO
s
vs
.B
As
Int
era
cti
on
s
Lo
git
(S
E)
Lo
git
(S
E)
Lo
git
(S
E)
Lo
git
(S
E)
Pr
ofi
tab
ili
ty:
br
ea
ke
ve
n
0.5
13
(0
.17
5)
**
*
0.4
59
(0
.24
2)
*
0.5
79
(0
.35
2)
*
0.2
60
(0
.40
7)
Pr
ofi
tab
ili
ty:
pr
ofi
tab
le
0.9
44
(0
.20
3)
**
*
0.9
63
(0
.25
7)
**
*
1.3
14
(0
.36
2)
**
*
1.1
45
(0
.41
3)
**
*
Re
ve
nu
eg
ro
wt
h:
20
%
−
0.0
33
(0
.17
7)
−
0.1
00
(0
.24
0)
−
0.2
54
(0
.30
4)
−
0.4
06
(0
.34
8)
Re
ve
nu
eg
ro
wt
h:
50
%
−
0.4
99
(0
.21
8)
**
−
0.6
50
(0
.28
6)
**
−
0.6
25
(0
.40
8)
−
0.9
27
(0
.44
6)
**
Re
ve
nu
eg
ro
wt
h:
10
0%
−
0.5
04
(0
.20
0)
**
−
0.5
93
(0
.29
0)
**
−
0.7
28
(0
.42
9)
*
−
0.7
59
(0
.47
6)
Ma
na
ge
me
nt
tea
m:
so
me
tea
m
me
mb
ers
0.1
61
(0
.17
8)
0.1
72
(0
.22
4)
−
0.4
10
(0
.35
5)
−
0.4
84
(0
.40
7)
Ma
na
ge
me
nt
tea
m:
all
tea
m
me
mb
ers
−
0.0
39
(0
.17
4)
−
0.1
51
(0
.24
2)
−
0.5
78
(0
.41
4)
−
0.4
50
(0
.45
1)
Cu
rre
nt
inv
est
or
:e
xt.
inv
est
or
s–
un
fam
ili
ar
−
0.1
42
(0
.16
5)
0.0
09
(0
.22
8)
0.0
24
(0
.31
6)
−
0.1
67
(0
.38
2)
Cu
rre
nt
inv
est
or
:e
xt.
inv
est
or
s-
tie
r1
−
0.3
65
(0
.17
2)
**
−
0.3
16
(0
.22
7)
0.1
02
(0
.29
3)
0.1
84
(0
.36
3)
Bu
sin
ess
mo
de
l:
inn
ov
ati
on
-ce
nt
ere
d
0.0
80
(0
.20
0)
0.0
75
(0
.26
0)
0.0
45
(0
.38
4)
0.3
61
(0
.51
9)
Bu
sin
ess
mo
de
l:
loc
k-i
n
−
0.1
50
(0
.16
5)
−
0.0
99
(0
.24
2)
0.7
71
(0
.37
3)
**
0.9
89
(0
.43
0)
**
Bu
sin
ess
mo
de
l:
co
mp
lem
en
tar
yo
ffe
rin
g
0.0
84
(0
.18
7)
0.1
53
(0
.27
0)
0.5
87
(0
.36
5)
1.0
39
(0
.41
6)
**
Va
lue
-ad
de
do
fp
ro
du
ct/
ser
vic
e:
me
diu
m
0.0
83
(0
.17
0)
0.1
46
(0
.22
1)
0.3
40
(0
.34
0)
0.6
30
(0
.40
4)
Va
lue
-ad
de
do
fp
ro
du
ct/
ser
vic
e:
hig
h
0.0
54
(0
.18
7)
0.2
51
(0
.26
0)
0.2
49
(0
.30
8)
0.5
12
(0
.38
5)
Int
ern
ati
on
al
sca
lab
ili
ty:
mo
de
rat
e
−
0.2
50
(0
.18
2)
−
0.2
56
(0
.23
6)
−
0.6
26
(0
.26
2)
**
−
0.8
34
(0
.32
7)
**
Int
ern
ati
on
al
sca
lab
ili
ty:
ea
sy
−
0.2
50
(0
.19
5)
−
0.4
16
(0
.24
6)
*
−
0.6
63
(0
.38
8)
*
−
0.7
49
(0
.44
6)
*
N
(d
ec
isi
on
s)
11
,83
0
30
68
20
54
10
40
N
(d
ec
isi
on
ma
ke
rs)
45
5
11
8
79
40
Sa
mp
le
59
FO
sv
s.
39
6V
Cs
59
FO
sv
s.
59
VC
s
59
FO
sv
s.
20
BA
s
20
FO
sv
s.
20
BA
s
(co
nti
nu
ed
on
ne
xt
pa
ge)
J. Block, et al. Journal of Corporate Finance 58 (2019) 329–352
347
Ta
bl
e9
(co
nti
nu
ed
)
Mo
de
l
(3
a)
(3
b)
(4
a)
(4
b)
PS
M
No
PS
M
KN
N
1:
1
PS
M
No
PS
M
KN
N
1:
1
PS
M
Sa
mp
le
GE
Fs
vs
.L
BO
s
GE
Fs
vs
.L
BO
s
VC
vs
.
GE
Fs
+
LB
-
Os
VC
vs
.
GE
Fs
+
LB
Os
Int
era
cti
on
s
Lo
git
(S
E)
Lo
git
(S
E)
Lo
git
(S
E)
Lo
git
(S
E)
Pr
ofi
tab
ili
ty:
br
ea
ke
ve
n
−
0.4
17
(0
.17
5)
**
−
0.5
39
(0
.20
0)
**
*
−
0.4
95
(0
.09
8)
**
*
−
0.5
06
(0
.10
4)
**
*
Pr
ofi
tab
ili
ty:
pr
ofi
tab
le
−
0.7
28
(0
.20
1)
**
*
−
0.8
56
(0
.22
3)
**
*
−
0.8
74
(0
.11
6)
**
*
−
0.9
26
(0
.12
2)
**
*
Re
ve
nu
eg
ro
wt
h:
20
%
0.1
33
(0
.16
4)
0.1
88
(0
.18
6)
−
0.1
83
(0
.09
8)
*
−
0.1
20
(0
.10
8)
Re
ve
nu
eg
ro
wt
h:
50
%
0.4
86
(0
.17
9)
**
*
0.6
77
(0
.20
6)
**
*
−
0.0
26
(0
.11
1)
0.0
10
(0
.12
0)
Re
ve
nu
eg
ro
wt
h:
10
0%
0.4
19
(0
.19
2)
**
0.4
81
(0
.23
2)
**
0.2
83
(0
.12
0)
**
0.3
30
(0
.12
9)
**
Ma
na
ge
me
nt
tea
m:
so
me
tea
m
me
mb
ers
0.0
92
(0
.15
6)
0.1
67
(0
.18
9)
−
0.1
06
(0
.09
5)
−
0.1
55
(0
.10
3)
Ma
na
ge
me
nt
tea
m:
all
tea
m
me
mb
ers
0.6
10
(0
.19
1)
**
*
0.7
55
(0
.23
4)
**
*
0.0
18
(0
.11
2)
−
0.0
04
(0
.12
1)
Cu
rre
nt
inv
est
or
:e
xt.
inv
est
or
s–
un
fam
ili
ar
0.2
50
(0
.15
3)
0.2
49
(0
.17
9)
−
0.0
40
(0
.09
5)
−
0.0
04
(0
.10
5)
Cu
rre
nt
inv
est
or
:e
xt.
inv
est
or
s-
tie
r1
0.1
87
(0
.17
3)
0.1
36
(0
.19
5)
0.3
77
(0
.10
6)
**
*
0.3
34
(0
.11
4)
**
*
Bu
sin
ess
mo
de
l:
inn
ov
ati
on
-ce
nt
ere
d
0.2
35
(0
.18
7)
0.3
14
(0
.21
4)
0.5
44
(0
.11
1)
**
*
0.5
07
(0
.12
1)
**
*
Bu
sin
ess
mo
de
l:
loc
k-i
n
−
0.0
37
(0
.19
2)
−
0.0
69
(0
.23
1)
0.2
05
(0
.11
3)
*
0.1
74
(0
.12
3)
Bu
sin
ess
mo
de
l:
co
mp
lem
en
tar
yo
ffe
rin
g
0.0
69
(0
.17
0)
0.0
99
(0
.21
1)
0.1
07
(0
.10
9)
0.0
87
(0
.11
8)
Va
lue
-ad
de
do
fp
ro
du
ct/
ser
vic
e:
me
diu
m
−
0.3
25
(0
.17
3)
*
−
0.4
98
(0
.20
2)
**
0.1
19
(0
.09
8)
0.1
51
(0
.10
6)
Va
lue
-ad
de
do
fp
ro
du
ct/
ser
vic
e:
hig
h
−
0.2
66
(0
.17
2)
−
0.3
36
(0
.19
8)
*
0.2
31
(0
.10
8)
**
0.2
79
(0
.12
1)
**
Int
ern
ati
on
al
sca
lab
ili
ty:
mo
de
rat
e
−
0.1
29
(0
.17
5)
−
0.1
05
(0
.19
5)
−
0.0
34
(0
.09
8)
0.0
01
(0
.10
8)
Int
ern
ati
on
al
sca
lab
ili
ty:
ea
sy
−
0.2
34
(0
.18
2)
−
0.1
89
(0
.21
2)
0.1
12
(0
.10
6)
0.0
96
(0
.11
4)
N
(d
ec
isi
on
s)
71
24
44
20
17
,42
0
14
,24
8
N
(d
ec
isi
on
ma
ke
rs)
27
4
17
0
67
0
54
8
Sa
mp
le
18
9G
EF
sv
s.
85
LB
Os
85
GE
Fs
vs
.85
LB
Os
39
6V
Cs
vs
.2
74
GE
Fs
+
LB
Os
27
4V
Cs
vs
.2
74
GE
Fs
+
LB
Os
J. Block, et al. Journal of Corporate Finance 58 (2019) 329–352
348
Ta
bl
e1
0
Su
mm
ary
of
th
em
ain
fin
din
gs
.
Th
is
tab
le
pr
ov
ide
sa
su
mm
ary
of
ou
rm
ain
fin
din
gs
.T
he
att
rib
ut
es
us
ed
in
ou
rc
on
joi
nt
ex
pe
rim
en
ta
re
ran
ke
da
cc
or
din
gt
ot
he
ir
rel
ati
ve
im
po
rta
nc
e(
als
od
isp
lay
ed
in
Fig
.2
).
To
ca
lcu
lat
et
he
rel
ati
ve
im
po
rta
nc
eo
fe
ac
ha
ttr
ibu
te,
we
us
et
he
ran
ge
be
tw
ee
nt
he
att
rib
ut
el
ev
el
wi
th
th
el
ow
est
ut
ili
ty
va
lue
an
dt
he
lev
el
of
th
er
esp
ec
tiv
ea
ttr
ibu
te
wi
th
th
eh
igh
est
ut
ili
ty
ba
sed
on
th
ec
oe
ffi
cie
nt
so
ft
he
ma
in
mo
de
l(
Ta
ble
7)
.T
his
all
ow
sa
na
sse
ssm
en
to
fh
ow
str
on
ga
ch
an
ge
in
an
att
rib
ut
e's
lev
el
do
es
aff
ec
tt
he
tot
al
ut
ili
ty
of
ap
ro
po
sed
co
mp
an
y.
Th
is
ran
ge
is
th
en
div
ide
db
yt
he
su
m
of
all
ran
ge
sf
or
ea
ch
de
cis
ion
ma
ke
r,
sh
ow
ing
th
er
ela
tiv
ei
mp
or
tan
ce
of
th
ea
ttr
ibu
tes
.T
he
va
lue
sd
isp
lay
ed
in
co
lum
n3
rep
res
en
tt
he
me
an
va
lue
sa
cro
ss
all
inv
est
or
typ
es'
,w
hil
ec
olu
mn
s4
an
d5
dis
pla
yt
he
inv
est
or
typ
e
wi
th
th
el
ow
est
an
dh
igh
est
im
po
rta
nc
e.
Th
efi
na
lc
olu
mn
co
nt
ain
sa
br
ief
qu
ali
tat
ive
su
mm
ary
of
th
em
ain
fin
din
gs
of
ou
rc
om
pa
rat
ive
an
aly
ses
an
di
sb
as
ed
on
Ta
ble
8.
Al
la
ttr
ibu
tes
are
de
fin
ed
in
Ta
ble
6.
W
ec
on
sid
er
fam
ily
offi
ce
s(
FO
s),
bu
sin
ess
an
ge
ls
(B
As
),
ve
nt
ur
ec
ap
ita
lf
un
ds
(V
Cs
),
gr
ow
th
eq
uit
yf
un
ds
(G
EF
s),
an
dl
ev
era
ge
db
uy
ou
tf
un
ds
(L
BO
s).
Ra
nk
At
tri
bu
te
Re
lat
ive
im
po
rta
nc
e
Lo
we
st
rel
ati
ve
im
po
rta
nc
e
Hi
gh
est
rel
ati
ve
im
po
rta
nc
e
Ma
in
res
ult
s(
qu
ali
tat
ive
su
mm
ary
)
1
Re
ve
nu
eg
ro
wt
h
23
.4%
13
.8%
(L
BO
s)
26
.3%
(V
Cs
)
Ma
jor
diff
ere
nc
es
ac
ro
ss
inv
est
or
typ
es:
les
si
mp
or
tan
tt
oF
Os
,L
BO
sa
nd
mo
re
im
po
rta
nt
to
VC
s,
GE
Fs
.
2
Va
lue
-ad
de
do
fp
ro
du
ct/
ser
vic
e
20
.4%
15
.3%
(B
As
)
22
.8%
(F
Os
)
Mi
no
rd
iff
ere
nc
es
ac
ro
ss
inv
est
or
s:
les
si
mp
or
tan
tt
oG
EF
s.
3
Tr
ac
kr
ec
or
do
fm
an
ag
em
en
tt
ea
m
15
.7%
4.8
%
(L
BO
s)
22
.1%
(B
As
)
Mi
no
rd
iff
ere
nc
es
ac
ro
ss
inv
est
or
s:
les
si
mp
or
tan
tt
oL
BO
s.
4
Int
ern
ati
on
al
sca
lab
ili
ty
13
.0%
10
.4%
(F
Os
)
17
.7%
(B
As
)
No
ma
jor
diff
ere
nc
es
in
im
po
rta
nc
ea
cro
ss
inv
est
or
typ
es.
5
Pr
ofi
tab
ili
ty
11
.8%
5.6
%
(B
As
)
31
.9%
(L
BO
s)
Ma
jor
diff
ere
nc
es
ac
ro
ss
inv
est
or
typ
es:
les
si
mp
or
tan
tt
oB
As
,V
Cs
an
dm
or
ei
mp
or
tan
tt
o
FO
s,
GE
Fs
,L
BO
s.
6
Bu
sin
ess
mo
de
l
8.3
%
7.1
%
(L
BO
s)
10
.3%
(F
Os
)
Ma
jor
diff
ere
nc
es
ac
ro
ss
inv
est
or
typ
es.
Le
ss
im
po
rta
nt
to
GE
Fs
,L
BO
sa
nd
mo
re
im
po
rta
nt
to
VC
s.
7
Cu
rre
nt
inv
est
or
s
7.3
%
5.0
%
(B
As
)
20
.4%
(L
BO
s)
Ma
jor
diff
ere
nc
es
ac
ro
ss
inv
est
or
typ
es:
les
si
mp
or
tan
tt
oG
EF
s,
LB
Os
an
dm
or
ei
mp
or
tan
tt
o
VC
s.
J. Block, et al. Journal of Corporate Finance 58 (2019) 329–352
349
3.3.1. Comparison between family offices (FOs) and venture capital funds (VCs)
Model 1a (Table 9) compares the investment criteria of FOs (N=59) and VCs (N=396). The results show that FOs attach higher
importance to profitability while they attach lower importance to revenue growth. Both findings are in line with the results reported
in our main analysis (Table 8, Model 1), underlining their robustness. Also, both results hold when utilizing PSM, reducing the sample
to 59 FOs and 59 VCs that are the most similar to these FOs (Model 1b).
In contrast to our main analysis, the results further show that, compared with VCs, FOs attach significantly lower importance to
the presence of reputable investors in the portfolio company. This effect can be attributed to VCs high preference for the presence of
reputable investors as a signal certifying company quality (Hsu, 2004; Hochberg et al., 2007). In contrast to VCs, FOs may be more
reluctant to partner with prominent investors because the costs associated with co-investing are higher for FOs in the presence of a
reputable investor. For example, co-investing generally leads to a higher likelihood of difficult negotiations between the parties
involved (Fried and Hisrich, 1995). If the co-investing party is a reputable investor, the FO will have a weaker negotiation position
that discourages co-investing. Additionally, it is more difficult for a FO to sanction the opportunistic behavior of a reputable investor
compared to more unknown investors. Also, reputable investors are more likely to be active and shape their portfolio companies
Cumming and Zhang (2018) as well as introduce high-growth policies to accelerate faster public markets that are incoherent with the
capital preservation goals of FOs. Notice, however, that this effect does not persist when reducing the sample of VCs via PSM (Model
1b).
3.3.2. Comparison between family offices (FOs) and business angels (BAs)
Model 2a (Table 9) compares the investment criteria of FOs (N=59) and BAs (N=20). Both investor types share similarities, as
they are non-intermediated, tied to personal/family wealth, possibly confounded with non-financial motives, and represent the
smallest investor types in our sample (with regard to assets under management). We find that FOs put a comparatively higher
emphasis on profitability and a lower emphasis on revenue growth. While these differences (especially with regard to the importance
of revenue growth) are not as pronounced, they correspond to the results of our main analysis. Model 2b reports the results of the
regression performed after PSM. The drop in significance can be at least partially attributed to the decreased sample sizes (N=79 for
Model 2a, N=40 for Model 2b). Further differences emerge with regard to the importance of selected business models and inter-
national scalability. FOs have a higher preference for lock-in business models than BAs. This higher preference is mainly due to BAs
aversion against lock-in business models, as shown in the main analysis (Table 8, Model 2). Similarly, the main analysis shows that
BAs have a general preference for higher international scalability. The results remain qualitatively similar when reducing the sample
via PSM (Model 2b). Overall, these results allude to a different risk-taking behavior, with FOs being more risk-averse and BAs being
more risk-prone. This is similar to the results obtained when comparing FOs to VCs.
3.3.3. Comparison between growth equity funds (GEFs) and leveraged buyouts (LBOs)
Model 3a (Table 9) compares the investment criteria of GEFs (N=189) and LBOs (N=85). GEFs and LBOs constitute investor
types that are particularly crucial in later-stage financing and are often treated as the same group of investors (e.g., Gompers et al.,
2016a; Ritter, 2015). Indeed, our main analysis suggests that GEFs and LBOs are rather similar in their investment preferences.
However, the more nuanced robustness checks uncover differences between both investor types when comparing them directly.
Major differences between GEFs and LBOs exist with regard to the importance of profitability as an investment criterion. While
GEFs attach less importance to high levels of profitability, high profitability is crucial to LBOs. This difference was not apparent in our
main analyses, as GEFs attach higher importance to profitability than all other investor types, which is mainly driven by VCs. In
addition, the results show that GEFs attach higher importance to the management team's track record and lower importance to the
value-added of the portfolio company's product or service than LBOs. Both effects are in line with the results of the main analysis.
Also, utilizing PSM (Model 3b) to produce a more robust comparison shows that the results remain similar.
3.3.4. Comparison between venture capital funds (VCs) and growth equity funds (GEFs) plus leveraged buyouts (LBOs)
VCs, GEFs, and LBOs represent the major investor types in our sample. Gompers et al. (2016a) describe that considerable dif-
ferences in the behavior between VCs on the one side and the GEFs and LBOs should exist. We explore these differences in Model 4a
(Table 9), which compares the investment criteria of VCs (N=396) to GEFs and LBOs combined (N=274). However, the results are
largely in line with the results of the main model. This is not surprising, as the sample used here (N=670) covers 89% of the
investment professionals in our entire sample (N=749). For example, VCs put less emphasis on profitability and significantly more
emphasis on high revenue growth. They also attach higher importance to the presence of reputable investors, innovation-centered
business models, and a higher value-added of the company's product or services. The results remain similar when reducing the sample
using PSM (Model 4b), confirming the robustness of our results.
4. Conclusions
PE investors place a heavy emphasis on their ability to select promising companies. In spite of the large interest in the decision-
making of PE investors, this study is among the first to assess the investment criteria of these investors. While there is an established
literature on the characteristics and behavior of specific types of investors, a broader perspective is underdeveloped. We compare the
investment criteria of different types of investors using a large-scale conjoint analysis of 19,474 screening decisions by 749 private
equity investors. The conjoint experiment enables a better understanding of the investment criteria of investors and allows a com-
parison of these criteria across investor types. We distinguish FOs, BAs, VCs, GEFs, and LBOs.
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In Table 10, we provide a summary of the many insights of the paper. For instance, we find that the management team is an
important investment criterion for our participants. However, we also find that investors rate revenue growth and the value-added
provided by the company's product or service to be more important than the management team's track record. The importance
attached to the management team does not significantly vary across investors. Second, we find two opposite views with regard to
profitability. While the investment criteria of FOs, GEFs, and LBOs are centered on highly profitable companies, BAs and VCs pay less
attention to the current profitability of their targets and instead focus on their scalability. Third, our study sheds light, for the first
time, on the investment criteria of FOs and finds that, relative to the average of other PE investors, FOs attribute greater importance
to current profitability of portfolio companies but less importance to their revenue growth. An explanation is that by undertaking
risky decisions, the managers of FOs risk losing family wealth and jeopardize the financial and social wellbeing of future family
generations. They are therefore more concerned with the conservation of irreplaceable capital through investments in already
profitable companies, rather than bearing the risk – and potentially high returns – of high-growth companies.
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